Since I am taking the bar exam next week, I will analyze this issue as an essay question under New York law
The issue is whether the cyclist has a cause of action for negligence against the jogger.
In order to show negligence, the cyclist must show that the jogger had a duty to him, that the jogger breached that duty, and that the breach of that duty was the factual and proximate cause of a legally redressable injury.
Under the majority rule followed in New York, a person owes a general duty of care to foreseeable plaintiffs. A cyclist on a MUT could be foreseeably harmed by a passing jogger who hits him on the head. Because the cyclist was a foreseeable plaintiff, the jogger owed the cyclist a duty of care.
In order to avoid breaching a general duty of care, a party must have behaved as a reasonably prudent person would under the circumstances. Note that this duty is objective, and does not consider the abilities of the individual defendant. Here, the jogger unreasonably failed to yield to the cyclist as an ordinarily prudent person would. The jogger therefore breached her duty of care to the cyclist.
A party is the factual cause of an injury if the injury would have happened but-for the actions of the party. In this situation, there is clear factual causation because the cyclist would not have crashed had he not been hit on the head. A party is the proximate cause of a harm if the harm is reasonably foreseeable based on the action. It is reasonably foreseeable that being hit on the head would cause a cyclist to crash. Therefore, the jogger was both the proximate and factual cause of the harm.
Finally, to prevail in a claim for negligence, a party must have suffered injury. Here, the cyclist has suffered momentary damages to due the broken wheel.
For the reasons stated above, the cyclist will therefore be able to sustain a valid negligence action against the jogger.
A sub-issue exist as to whether the jogger had a duty to aid the cyclist after he crashed. Under both the common law and New York law, there is no general duty to aid an injured party. An exception exists if the party created a peril. However, in this case, there was no ongoing peril. Instead, the jogger merely caused inconvenience to the cyclist. The jogger therefore had no legal duty to assist the cyclist in returning home.
An additional sub issue is whether the jogger's apology will be admissible in court, subject to any of the hearsay exceptions.
Generally, hearsay is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Both the common law and New York recognize certain exceptions to the hearsay rule. In this case, the statement by the jogger would be recognized as a party-admission. A party admission is a statement by the liable party or their lawful agent tending to show liability for the harm caused. The Federal Rule of Evidence recognize this as an exclusion from the hearsay rules, while New York recognizes this as an exception from hearsay.
Here, the jogger's statement "I'm sorry" may be interpreted as an implicit admission of negligence, thus falling under the party admission hearsay.
Accordingly, the jogger's statement will be admissible in court.
^^^ The above is not legal advice! ^^^
